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Intentionality and the emergence of complexity:
an analytical approach
Fe´lix-Fernando Mun˜oz ·Marı´a-Isabel Encinar
Abstract Emergence is a generic property that makes economies become complex.
The simultaneous carrying out of agents’ intentional action plans within an economic
system generates processes that are at the base of structural change and the emer-
gence of adaptive complex systems. This paper argues that goals and intentionality
are key elements of the structure of rational human action and are the origin of emer-
gent properties such as innovation within economic complex systems. To deal with
the locus and role of goals and intentionality in relation to the emergence of complex-
ity we propose an analytical approach based on agents’ action plans. Action plans are
open representations of the action projected by agents (as individuals or organiza-
tions), where the means (actions) and objectives (or goals) are not necessarily given,
but produced by agents themselves.
Keywords Intentionality · Action plans · Emergence of novelty · Complexity
JEL Classifications B41 · B52 · D89 · O10
Wemay therefore feel justified in treating economic systems as a relatively new
class of manifestations of a general evolutionary principle of building systems
bymaking selective connections between elements of existing systems.Wemay
also feel justified in seeking to analyse the structure of each system without
investigating its elements in detail. However, when we encounter human-
based systems an important modification of the neo-Darwinian version of this
principle is required: neither random genetic mutation nor selection by differ-
ential genetic inheritance is appropriate. We must introduce intentionality.
(Loasby 2012: 837 )
1 Introduction
Economics focuses on the parts of action that are rational (even in contexts of true
uncertainty) and involves the allocation of scarce means to goals. Thus economic
actions, and actions in general, are configured and deployed on the basis of rea-
sons for acting (Searle 2001; Bratman 1987 [1999]). Rational action is first planned
and then carried out in interaction with other agents within a system and in accor-
dance with the corresponding plans of action. Of course, not all human action is
planned -feelings and emotions may play a very important real role in an individual’s
action- and planned actions may produce unintended consequences. However, as far
as economists are concerned, the main focus is on the part of the action that is the
result of deliberation and choice as Mises (1949) pointed out.
Economic agents interact in economic complex systems. In recent decades there
has been an increasing amount of literature in which the economy is considered to
be an evolving complex system (Anderson et al. 1988; Blume and Durlauf 2006).
Amongst others, important examples include the Santa Fe Institute, a large part of
evolutionary economics (Witt 2003) and literature on innovation systems (Antonelli
2011). There are many factors that lead to the emergence of complexity in human
interaction systems.1 Some of these factors depend on agents’ heterogeneity -their
basic characteristics differ in terms of original endowments such as learning capabili-
ties, size, location, etc. This said, agents also differ in their goals and intentionality. In
the area of social sciences, psychology and neuroscience, etc., the concept of “inten-
tionality” (which dates back to Brentano (1874))2 has also gained momentum: in the
last ten years, the number of articles and other papers containing the term ‘intention-
ality’ in their title, keywords or abstract has grown immensely. For example, between
2002 and 2011, the number of papers referenced in the ISI-Thompson and Scopus
databases totaled 1161 and 1704 respectively. However, it is rare to find the connec-
tion between both semantic fields, i.e. “intentionality” + “economics” and the topic
seems to be marginal in economics in comparison with neuroscience, for example.
Some economists celebrate the fact that intentionality (and other “folk psychol-
ogy” terms (Hands 2001)) tends to disappear in economics. However, in recent years
the debate about the role of purposeful action, intentionality and the elements that
encourage action and knowledge has been revived in this field, at least among evolu-
tionary economists (see for example Hodgson and Knudsen 2007, 2011; Levit et al.
2011; Nelson 2007; Vanberg 2006; Witt 2006).3 Some authors have used different
1Emergence is a key generic property that makes economies become complex (Harper and Endres 2012).
2A good classic precedent in philosophy is Ascombe (1957). An interesting approach quite complemen-
tary to ours is Bratman’s (1987 [1999], 1999). (See also Bratman et al. (1988).) An interesting review is
Zimmerman (1989).
3In a quite related field, Arthur (2007, 2009) has stressed the purposeful character of (actions that give rise
to) invention and technical development.
analytical approaches to highlight the need to associate intentionality with economics
and position it at the base of the explanation of economic processes as processes that
generate complexity (Antonelli 2011; Mun˜oz et al. 2011; Rubio de Urquı´a 2003;
Levit et al. 2011; Wagner 2012 among others).
This paper’s main concern is to understand the sources and the process of eco-
nomic change. More specifically, it investigates the role of agents’ intentionality in
the generation of economic processes that give rise to complex adaptive systems. As
will be shown, agents’ goals and intentionality play an essential role in explaining
the emergence of complexity in economic systems. Thus, economic dynamics may
be understood as the process for the generation, selection and attempted implemen-
tation in the interaction of agents’ intentional action -and not only choices (Lane
et al. 1996)- and their consequences.
Accordingly, we use an action plan approach (Encinar and Mun˜oz 2006). This
approach allows us to establish micro-foundations (Felin and Foss 2009) that give rise
to phenomena and processes such as the intentional orientation of projective action,
the continuous appearance, dissemination and retention of novelty in economics, cre-
ative responses (Antonelli and Ferraris 2011; Kelly 1963: 8) and entrepreneurship,
evolutionary capabilities (Can˜ibano et al. 2006), etc., that otherwise have no place in
an eminently static approach (a-temporal, in the sense of Shackle (1972, 1977)). The
fact that an unseen or unheard-of event arises from the interaction of these intentional
dynamics is another matter. Nevertheless, this does not discount the fact that a key
source of complexity lies in the agents’ intentionality: intentionality has a systemic
structure capable of producing unexpected events. The generation, dissemination and
use of knowledge is fundamental for explaining the complexity of economic pro-
cesses (Loasby 1999), however it is not sufficient to provide a full explanation of
these phenomena. We claim that the intentionality-knowledge binomial lies at the
base of complexity and evolution.
The structure of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we present the conceptual
base of the action plan and the analytical approach to develop our main argument,
which links intentionality to agents’ action plans. Section 3 proposes an analytical
representation of agents’ action that allows us to identify both the locus for inten-
tionality and the necessary connections between the formation and the carrying out
of plans in interdependent contexts. Section 4 examines the role of intentionality
and its dynamic consequences in terms of production of new realities (novelties) and
emergent properties. It is shown that intentionality is a sufficient (but not necessary)
condition for the emergence of new properties within complex systems. The paper
ends with some concluding remarks.
2 Intentionality and agents’ action plans
Economic agents interact in economic systems that are of an evolving complex kind;
economies are non-ergodic systems; economic processes are historical (North 2005)
and agents plan and deploy their courses of action in a context of radical uncer-
tainty (Knight 1921). In this context, the claim that an agent’s action is rational
means that it is configured and deployed on the basis of reasons. That is to say
that an agent’s action is, essentially, planned; i.e.: in accordance with action plans.
Action plans consist of the projected intentional sequence of actions that lead to goals
(Rubio de Urquı´a 2011: 414; see also Miller et al. 1960) posed in a future (imagined
in the sense of Loasby (1996)) time.4 An agent’s action plan may then be inter-
preted as an “analytical” template or guide for action that connects different kinds
of elements projectively (that is, towards an imagined future) in accordance with the
agent’s intentionality: something that is to be reached (objectives or goals) is con-
nected with actions that lead to it. These plans are drawn up by individuals, and they
are inherent to them. There may also be plans that outline the action and coordi-
nate the objectives of groups of people (all kinds of organizations).5 Action plans are
open representations of the action projected by the agents (as individuals or organi-
zations), where the means (actions /resources) and objectives (goals) are not given as
suggested by Robbins (1932), but rather are the results of the agents’ own planning
activity. The plans drawn up intentionally by the agents are those which, when car-
ried out in interdependent contexts, configure social and economic dynamics (Mun˜oz
and Encinar 2007): their consequences transform the agents themselves as well as
the physical-natural, but above all human environment in which they interact.6 When
agents evaluate the consequences of their interactions they may perceive (or not) the
inconsistencies of their plans and revise (fully, partially or not at all) their config-
urations, and, eventually, learn. The dynamics of interaction generates complexity
because of this feedback mechanism. The consequence is a restless mechanism
(Metcalfe et al. 2006) of economic change, which in this context means the (eco-
nomic) dynamics of endogenous structural change are capable of inducing or
generating novelties.
Not all human action is planned: the actual action of an individual comprises both
planned action and unplanned action. Unplanned action is not something of residual
or trivial importance that is inaccessible to scientific knowledge. In fact feelings and
emotions play a very important and real role in an individual’s action. However, as
previously stated, our main interest lies with the part of the total action resulting from
deliberation. Moreover, planned action brings in a number of fundamental dynamic
elements that enable us to understand, for example, the dynamic role played by the
intentionality of the action, a phenomenon which we can analyze in detail, as the
following section shows.
2.1 Action plans
The concept of an action plan incorporates a number of important elements for
explaining rational human action. Two of those elements are the objectives and pro-
jective nature of the action. The bonds between means and goals logically depend on
what the agents know or think they know, i.e. on what we refer to as their cognitive
dynamics (which we will refer to as CD). CD refers to the understanding agents have
4Fuster (2003, 2008) physiologically locates action plans in the prefrontal cortex of humans.
5For example a family’s travel plans, the business or production plans of a company, etc.
6The concept of action plan has been used with different formalization by economists as diverse as
Lachmann (1994 [1976]), Keynes (1936), Hicks (1939), Stackelberg (1946 [1943]), Barnard (1938),
Debreu (1959), Penrose (1959), Malinvaud (1999), Boulding (1991), etc.
of reality, where this understanding is condensed into representation systems made
by agents (according to scientific-technical representations). CD also refers to beliefs
in terms of what this reality is like and to the evolution of this understanding.
However, plans are established intentionally according to the objectives and targets
that agents wish to achieve. These objectives and targets guide the action and give
it meaning. Therefore, we can distinguish analytically between agents’ perception of
what reality is like or could be like in the future - agents’ CD- and their conception of
what reality should be: their ethical dynamics, referred to as ED. Together with socio-
cultural dynamics (SD),7 in which the agents deploy their activity, both dynamics
modify the content and form of the plans and, consequently, generate new realities.
These realities stand as a contrast between what has previously been conjectured (in
the sense of Popper (1972)) in the agents’ action plans (ex ante) and what they (ex
post) understand as what has actually happened. The compared balances between
expectations and events (may) activate review mechanisms (learning) of the agents’
plans and the way in which they are formulated.
As shown below, economic dynamics can be understood as the process for the
generation, selection and (attempted) interactive implementation of agents’ action
plans and its consequences. The alteration of intentionality implies that agents’ action
plans are internally modified and that the interactive implementation of the new plans
generates new realities. Indeed, the introduction of new objectives alters not only
the spaces of objectives but also induces new types of knowledge, capabilities and
actions.
Let pith represent the action plan h of an individual i at the time t. The plan p
i
th
consists of executing in t actions aith1 and a
i
th2, to reach in t + 1 the goal Gi(t+1)h1
and, also in t + 1, executing actions ai
(t+1)h3, a
i
(t+1)h4 and a
i
(t+1)h5, to finally achieve
the objective Gi(t+2)h2 in t + 2. The hierarchy of goals is as follows: Gi∗(t+2)h3 is the
main goal and Gi
(t+2)h2 and G
i
(t+1)h1 are both lower level goals.
From a theoretical point of view, an action plan pith can have, in general, any
projective linkage structure. These linkages are represented in Fig. 1 by arrows
indicating the direction -intention- of the action to an objective. The linkages can
include estimates of probability (both ‘objective’ and subjective probability) or con-
jecture, all kinds of conditionalities (also including strategic plans); feedbacks; etc.
Of course, the planpith may be defined incompletely by the agent. In that case, the
plan pith may include connections or actions that are not fully specified, pending
future specifications.
Many outstanding features and properties of personal action plans can be known in
relation to internal, logical or material consistency and ex ante and ex post feasibility
(see Bhattacharyya et al. 2011; Sen 1993). Moreover, plans may involve a hierar-
chical structure of goals that can include a wide variety of contents: from low-level
hierarchical determination (no goal is worth much more than another) to high-level
hierarchical determination. Thus, the structure of a plan’s goals can be inconsistent
7Culture, defined as in North (2005), plays a fundamental role in economic change.
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Fig. 1 Example of an action plan
insofar as one or more of the goals contained in the plan may be incompatible with
other goals within the same plan.8
The hierarchical structure of goals allows for a simple representation: Fig. 1 shows
both a sequence and a hierarchy of goals. For example, in t + 2, the goal Gi∗
(t+2)h3
occupies a higher hierarchical position than Gi(t+2)h2, this being represented by
drawing the former above the latter.
2.2 Bundles of action plans
In general, agents try to deploy several action plans; we will refer to this set of action
plans as a bundle of action plans, Bit . Figure 2 illustrates a bundle of action plans B
i
t .
The bundle represented in Fig. 2 comprises three action plans and four periods of
time: t to t + 3. At time t, the projected action relative to the individual i is based
on these three plans. The chart has some intersections that are not empty between
plans because they have elements (both means and goals) in common. Accordingly,
for example, action at13, located in terms of time at time t + 1, inherent to plan 1, is
also necessary for achieving targetGt22 inherent to plan 2. In addition, the bundle Bit
has a projective horizon of three periods, but not all the plans have the same duration
in terms of reference time and not all the plans start and end at the same times in this
reference time.9
8Investigation cannot pre-exclude plans that contain systems of goals that are internally inconsistent. In
fact, these kinds of plans may form part of the reality under study and constitute an interesting field of
study in themselves. See for example Encinar (2002).
9As far as plans are components of a bundle, and are intrinsically linked together forming a whole course of
action, each pattern of bundling may be understood as an attempt at tentative modularization of action by
the agent. The plans that form the bundle (three plans in Fig. 2) would be themselves quasi-decomposable
modules of a higher level “system” of actions-goals –the bundle- that would direct the future course of
action of the agent. For the meaning of quasi-decomposability and modularization see, respectively, Simon
(1962) and Langlois (2002).
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Fig. 2 Bundle of action plans Bit
3 An analytic representation of agents’ action
Despite the fact that goals can be treated analytically as static elements, intentional-
ity is inherently dynamic. Intentionality is understood as the tendency towards a goal
that first appears in the individual’s mind as a purpose. This definition of intention-
ality is closely linked to the concept of plan. Intention is the determination of will in
accordance with a purpose. Additionally, intention is what makes it possible to dif-
ferentiate between the purposes of individuals (or groups of individuals) and their
mere desires. The latter do not necessarily activate subjects’ actions or, therefore,
their intentions. However, the conception of purpose activates behavior and actions
that focus on their achievement through intention and will.10 Agents can be distin-
guished on the basis of their knowledge and skills, but also by the purposes they
pursue. All this leads to agents being able to introduce a wide variety of changes in
the environment through their actions, altering other agents’ space of action.
This section proposes a model of agent action in order to identify the necessary
connections between the formation (constitution) and interactive implementation of
intentional plans and the production of new realities and emergent properties that
change the landscape of the system. The model has the advantage of offering a sum-
marized representation of the elements that configured the projected action by agents,
its interactive implementation and its transformation into real (external/observed)
action. The model has three building blocks -agents, actions/means, and goals- that
are connected in action plans, and four analytical stages (see Fig. 3) –formation;
10The new goal psychology represents a step forward in the integration of motives for action with psy-
chological theories, generally cognitive, on human action. The links are the very goals or objectives of the
action. See various chapters in the Oxford Handbook of Human Action (Morsella et al. 2009), especially
those included in part 2 (dedicated to the activation, selection and expression of action) and in Moskowitz
and Grant (2009). On motivation in Economics see Frey and Jegen (2001) and Gerschlager (2012).
Building blocks
action plans
Analytical stages
(a) Agents
(b) Actions
(c) Goals
(1) Formation
(2) Selection
(3) Interaction
(4) Evaluation
Fig. 3 Constitutive elements of the model
selection; interactive implementation and evaluation of the consequences of action
plans.
3.1 The (evolutionary) stages of agent action11
1. Formation: The first stage in the model of agent action is the process by which
individuals form their bundles of individual action plans, in each instant of time
t, Bit . From these bundles of plans B
i
t , agents establish a hierarchy, determine
some of them as possible, B˜it , and choose the bundle, Bˆ
i
t , that best satisfies their
objectives.12 Logically, the relation between these bundles of plans is: B˜it ⊂ Bit ,
Bˆit = max
{
B˜it
}
, where
{
Bit , B˜
i
t , Bˆ
i
t
}
= ∅.
In each instant of time t, the specific content of Bit is shaped by means of the
current agent’s set of beliefs, values, attitudes, representations of reality that the
individual i holds at that time t. We will refer to this set as the agents ensemble of
beliefs, etc. -or simply the ensemble-Eit .
13 Both the elements and the relationships
between them contained in the ensemble are the result of the previously mentioned
ethical, cognitive and socio-cultural dynamics (EDit , CD
i
t and SDt respectively)
of the agents. In particular, SDt , which includes the general environment (includ-
ing institutional settings, technologies, habits and rules, etc.) within which agents
are inserted and deploy their actions. The ensemble Eit supports the subjective
domain of planning, i.e., how the world is made; what is possible and what is not;
11Subsections 3.1 and 3.2 are grounded and develop the approach by Rubio de Urquı´a (2005) introducing
intentionality within the analytical framework.
12This bundle in a neoclassical account would roughly correspond to the bundle that maximises some
objective function (utility, profits, etc.). However, in a more general (and realistic, that is, where true uncer-
tainty prevails) framework the agent chooses bundles that “meet targets of adequacy rather than pinnacles
of attainment” (Earl 1983: 78–81). It is very interesting to compare our analytical stages with those pro-
posed respectively by Earl and Potts. The former (Earl 1983: 149-150) presents a multistage process in
which the agent proceeds sequentially as follows: (1) problem recognition (a failure to match up to aspira-
tions), (2) search of (not given) courses of action, (3) evaluation of possible sequels of particular choices,
(4) choice itself, (5) implementation (often difficult and partially accomplished), and (6) assessment (the
agent examines to which extent what was decided was achieved). Potts (2000: 120–123) addresses the
problem of acting in a non-integral space. Agents must form conjectures as a solution by means of search-
ing among adjacent possibilities which relationships may solve (are more promising ways of solving) their
particular problems. The ‘decision cycle’ that makes these operations possible consists of four separate
components: {LIST, CONSTRUCT, RANK, SELECT}. The main point in Potts’ proposal is that, for him,
these conjectures are the agents’ preferences (note the conjectural character of action plans).
13The ensemble refers to the “reality” such as it is conceived by the agents in order to produce their action.
what is known and what is not, in relation to the past, present and future; what
the individuals acting can do; what is best and what is worst for these individuals;
what they want and what they do not.14 In short, Eit defines the subjective pos-
sible courses of action and provides elements of valuation for organizing them in
relation to what should be, what is desired and what is preferred by the agent at
each time t. This concept of ensemble is quite similar to Bratman’s (see Bratman
et al. 1988) conception of belief/desire/intention (BDI) architecture. For Bratman
the (BDI)-architecture includes fair representations of agent’s beliefs, desires, and
intentions. However, the ensemble also includes the set of representations of real-
ity that the individual i holds at a specific time t: it defines the subjective projective
space of action of the individual i at each time t. Whereas in Bratman’s approach
agents’ intentions are structured into larger plans, in our approach, intentionality
is the source that structurally and temporally orders the contents of those plans;
that is, intentionality generates the “library” of notional actions required to reach
the goals pursued by the agents, giving sense and rationality, to their actions. Thus
our approach allows us to deal with intentionality as the last source of rationality
of actions.
2. Selection: Each ensemble Eit contains a structure of alternative planned action
possibilities that denotes intentionality. After considering different planned pos-
sibilities, the individual selects one bundle Bˆit at each instant t, and begins to
execute the actions (and reach the goals) corresponding to that instant t. In other
words, at time t, the individual (organization) adopts one of the possible courses
of action, the bundle Bˆit by means of an active decision which, among other ele-
ments, implies closing the hierarchical structure of all the alternatives of action
with regard to the agent’s ensemble, Eit . The ensemble generates the selected
bundle:15
Eit →
{
Bˆit
}
This process of selection is internal to the agent’s subjective domain of action.
3. Interaction: From individual planned action to individual observable action. It
is by means of the simultaneous carrying out of plans in interdependent contexts
14The term “beliefs” refers to the set of conceptions, representations and knowledge to which the indi-
vidual is faithful. In general, beliefs imply evaluation criteria that organize the projective action and the
action of decision among alternatives and value judgments. “Values” is understood as the set of valuation
criteria effectively used by the individual to projectively organize the action and issue value judgments.
The possible difference between the valuation criteria implied by the beliefs and those effectively used in
practice must be acknowledged. Values include tastes and preferences. “Attitudes” refers to stable features
that introduce determination in certain aspects.
15In our approach, the symbol → neither represents a logical relationship (for example a material condi-
tional if-then relationship) nor a mathematical function that relates two (or more) variables (as is the case
of a production function, for instance). It designates a mode -that is, a conventional sign- of representing
a necessary causal relationship among theoretical structures. Quite a different issue is that in some very
specific circumstances it is possible to characterize parts of a theory of human action by means of proper
(not imposed) mathematical structures as is the case of neoclassical economics under highly restrictive
theoretical assumptions.
that planning connects to observable action. It is at this stage when, on one hand,
intentionality emerges and produces external reality and, on the other, it is possible
to show the analytical link between the micro- (individual) and meso-level. This
is the crucial stage in which action is deployed interactively, producing instants
of reality and the historical consequences of action –those that are captured in
ordinary statistical measures, etc.
4. Evaluation: Moreover, interaction reveals which parts of the plans of interacting
agents within a system are or are not compatible, and it retains ex post which parts
of goals and courses of action considered ex ante as possible have been successful.
In other words: agents examine whether or not their conjecture (the bundle of
plans) was correct and thereby whether their goals have been attained. If evidence
is in some sense unsatisfactory agents would revise how they form their plans in
order to try and do so otherwise.16 Thus, as long as plans are being developed
they are evaluated and processes of learning are triggered. Interaction generates a
process of selection external to the agent.
In order to develop these ideas, we need to open up the internal production of action
“the black box” via a sequence of two intermediate steps:
Step 1: Let sit be the state of the individual i at instant t, which comprises the state
of the individual in biological and mental terms; his/her individual dynam-
ics EDit and CD
i
t , as well as everything that is external to the individual
and may play a role in his/her actions.17 Let be δi a kind of operator that
binds together EDit , CD
i
t and SDt ; with both the agent’s state s
i
t and the
state of the non-human environment at t, ut ; that is, with
(
sit , ut
)
. Thus, the
formation of δi includes the dynamics EDit , CD
i
t and SDt , the sequence
of personal ensembles of i before the time t and “what it is”, including
“what it has been”. By means of δi the ensembles Eit and the bundles of
plans Bˆit are continuously being formed by the individual i at time t. Thus:
δi
(
sit , ut
)
→
{
Eit
}
→
{
Bˆit
}
Step 2: Let Ait denote the action really deployed by the individual i at instant t
and αi denote the system of relations that binds together the final action
exercised Ait and the action planned in bundle Bˆ
i
t for the individual i at
time t; in other words:
αi
(
Bˆit
)
→ Ait
The dynamic αi is based on the personal principles related to the relation-
ship between planned action and unplanned action. Thus, the unplanned
16This stage is rather similar to the one that Earl (1983: 150) has called “assessment” in his multistage
process model of choice.
17The agent’s state may include explicitly the agent’s “biography”; the set of all the states of all the
individuals other than i prior to time t that may influence the agent.
Fig. 4 The subjective and objective domains of action
action forms part of what is indicated in αi .18 It is when the agent deploys
Ait that intentionality emerges, when we shift from the individual planned
action to the individual observed action.
The process of interactive implementation of plans partly configures the economic
dynamics –transforming the external (objective) reality as well as the internal (sub-
jective) realities of agents. This process depends not only on how plans are internally
formed, and on their structure and content, but also on the results of interaction.
Figures 4 and 5 summarize these ideas.
3.2 Interaction with n-agents
At each instant of time t, there are nt agents in the economy.19 According to their
previous states and what they understood as their own current state, economic agents
generate their own instantaneous personal ensemble, Eit . Therefore, at each instant t
there is a set of personal ensembles Eit :
{
E1t , E
2
t . . . E
nt
t
}
. Depending on their own
Eit , and by means of δ
i , each agent produces a set of bundles of potential courses
of action Eti → Bti , and selects a bundle of action plans -which corresponds to the
planned courses of action that each individual tries to deploy, Bˆit :
{
Bˆ1t , Bˆ
2
t . . . Bˆ
nt
t
}
.
Both the set of all projected bundles of action plans (imagined and deemed as pos-
sible by agents) Bit and its subset of selected bundles of action plans Bˆ
i
t imply
intentionality.
However, for the selected action plans that give rise to action, the operator αi ,
mediates, producing the actual action of each agent i at each instant of time t :{
A1t , A
2
t . . . A
nt
t
}
. Finally, the action deployed by each agent in the economy together
18They could be unplanned actions due to, for example, the use of routines, rules, procedures and
behavioural habits, which also generate consequences, expected or otherwise, in action.
19At t it may be that nt ≥ nt−1 or that nt < nt−1.
Fig. 5 Extended and resumed representations of agent action “black box”
with each agent’s own state at t, sit :
{
s1t , s
2
t . . . s
nt
t
}
, interact. As a consequence
of that interaction, the dynamics of generation of new individual states (including
new knowledge, beliefs, attitudes, etc.) is produced, transforming both human and
non-human environments, (new artefacts, institutions, ut , etc.). In turn, the dynamic
for the generation of agents’ states ‘returns’ new states for the individuals and non-
human environments that re-nourish the formation and interactive implementation of
the action in the next instant t + 1.
Figure 6 shows the interactive implementation of action, represented by St . It is
at this stage when agents interact and produce new instants of reality.
Finally, the form adopted by St depends on the decision of the modeller. Thus,
St may include networks of agents, functional relationships without structural
change, etc.
3.3 Action and economic theory
Obviously, planning is not economic action -as shown by the difference between Bˆit
andAit . Planning is a part of action (an activity itself), but not the kind of action that is
truly relevant for economics.20 Economic theory has usually focused on the analysis
and development of models based on a special version of the dynamic δ understood
as an optimization principle. This version of δ operates over a hierarchized set Bit and
a subsequent subset (hierarchized and deemed possible) B˜it of the latter, and selects
Bˆit .
As all bundles of action plans depend –in our approach- on the pre-existence of
Eit , -becauseE
i
t projects the space of action of agents- it may be concluded that usual
economic theorizing takes (at least implicitly) the agents’ ensembles as given or for
granted. (For example, in the case of usual consumption theory, the preferences over
the consumption bundles are fixed a priori). The ‘closure’ of the economic models is
indeed necessary for the analysis of open systems, as Loasby (2003) has shown so
masterfully. If we are interested in assigning any role for intentionality, the closure
has to be placed at the level of Eit , where the choosable (in the words of Shackle
1977) is produced.
When the action projected by the agent is being deployed, planned action is “trans-
formed” into actual action. As we have pointed out, this transformation is the base
of the production of ‘actual’ human action; in other words, the production of instants
of reality. This transformation requires the analytical concurrence of the dynamic α.
The production of the specific (and complete) reality of the agent is not completed
20How individuals set goals, etc., is very important for other disciplines such as psychology. (See for
instance, Ajzen 1991; Miller et al. 1960; Moskowitz and Grant 2009).
Fig. 6 A representation of the structure of agent interaction
until the operation of α, which triggers the interactive implementation of the action
that is at the base of complex phenomena.
4 Intentionality and the emergence of complexity
Emergence is a generic property that makes economies become complex. The emer-
gence of complexity within an economic system is not (necessarily) intentional; but
depends on the agents’ intentions, even though what happens is not necessarily what
is being sought by agents. Observed actions can differ from what was intentionally
sought -when they were projected actions- although this is compatible with the fact
that intentionality is present in the analytical structure of action. The question about
where and when new properties emerge may be addressed as follows. New proper-
ties emerge because agents: (a) discover or invent new actions; and/or (b) discover
or “invent” new objectives; and/or (c) rearrange previously existing actions and goals
in a new way. Agents implement all these new or revised actions and/or goals into
new plans21 and try to deploy such action plans in interaction with other agents and
the external environment. Thus, revised actions consist of introducing entirely new
actions linked to existing objectives (a radical understanding of novelty (Witt 1996))
or changing (or cancelling) the links between actions and objectives; revised objec-
tives consist of introducing entirely new ones or of changing the hierarchy of already
existing objectives. However, it is as a consequence of the simultaneous carrying out
of actions in interdependent contexts (S) that novelties emerge.
21New in the sense of “unheard-of”.
Thus, the emergence of novelties can be both (1) the result of an agent’s internal
dynamics
(
that reproduce new Eit , Bˆ
i
t and A
i
t
)
, and/or (2) the result of interaction
processes between agents. The former refers to conscious and intentional acts
undertaken by agents; the latter refers mainly to unexpected products of interactions
among action plans.22
Once new properties emerge, they fuel the processes of structural change as a nec-
essary consequence as agents incorporate them into their space of action –via Eit
and
{
Bˆit
}
. Regardless of where novelties emerge, if they have any effect it is because,
by necessity, novelties are incorporated into agents’ action plans, producing specific
actions, Ait , and novelties are disseminated through the interaction of agents’ action
plans.23 When agents evaluate the results of interactions and learn, they perceive (or
perhaps not) the inconsistencies of their plans and revise (fully, partially or not at all)
their configurations, as feedback for their ensembles δi(· · · ) → Eit →
{
Bˆit
}
. The
consequence of this interaction is a restless mechanism that generates continuous
structural change.
Once the structural components of the model have been specified and extended
to nt-agents -
(
E1t · · ·Entt , δ1 · · · δnt , α1 · · ·αnt
)
-, the process of economic change
acquires full meaning, generating the states
(
sit , ut
)
, ∀i: when any structural element
changes, novelties emerge and then at least a new bundle of action plans (Bit ) is con-
figured. In the model, intentionality is located in the ensemble (Eit ) and deploys its
logic through the interaction of the revised agents’ plans. Revised action plans, in
which novelty has already emerged, induce economic change giving rise to processes
of novelty-dissemination. Revised action plans are a source of complexity as far as
they feed the generation of the renewed variety characteristic of evolutionary pro-
cesses. Intentionality is a sufficient –but not necessary- condition for the emergence
of new properties within complex systems.
Finally, interaction leads to the general dynamic of production of social and
economic reality and (due to the appearance of all kinds of novelties -creative
responses, unexpected consequences of actions, rationed action, positive or nega-
tive externalities, path-dependency, etc.) breaks down the sequences of the effective
implementation of action plans, and triggers a dynamic of constant disequilibrium.
These disequilibria do not lead to chaos, but rather generate complexity in the
system of agents in interaction and in the non-social medium. According to the
responses (positive or negative feedback (Miller and Page 2007)), systems stabilize
22Owing to this, novelties cannot be uncaused causes as Hodgson (2004, chap. 3) suggests: the ultimate
cause is the intentionality of agents. In an example provided by Schumpeter’s (2005 [1932]) Mantegna’s
innovations could be interpreted as a conscious and individual act undertaken by the painter; the
‘Renaissance style’ produced unexpected innovations in painting as a result of painters interactions.
23As has been said above, in economics the simplest example of S is a perfect-competition market; in
this structure of interaction –in which agents, agents’ goals, and structure of interaction do not change-
the consequences S are expressed in terms of the complex of produced and consumed quantities and the
equilibrium price. Of course S may be more complex: we may think that there is rationing equilibria
(Benassy 1986; Malinvaud 1977); non-market interactions (Schelling 1978); network effects (Katz and
Shapiro 1994); etc.
or increase/decrease their degree of complexity. The logic of this entire mesh of inter-
action is more evident in specific case studies. Moreover, this logic appears more
clearly when the level of analysis chosen by the theory is between the micro-meso
and meso-macro levels (Dopfer 2011; Dopfer et al. 2004).24
5 Concluding remarks
This paper argues that intentionality is a key element of the structure of rational
action and that it is at the origin of emergent properties within economic complex
systems. The argument is consistent with the role that the categories of intentionality
-such as belief, goal, intention, collective intentionality, etc.- have in cognitive sci-
ences, artificial intelligence and social philosophy, as well as in the explanation of
individual and collective behavior and the emergence of institutions (Baldwin and
Baird 2001; Grosz and Hunsberger 2006; Malle et al. 2001; Metzinger and Gallese
2003).25 Intentionality -an agents’ feature of representations by which they are about
something or directed at something (Searle 1995)- is linked to goals and in order to
deal with the locus and role of goals and intentionality in relation to the emergence
of complexity we have developed a model based on agents’ action plans.26
There are many factors that lead to the emergence of complex properties in
human interaction systems. Some of these factors depend on the fact that agents
are intrinsically heterogeneous -their basic characteristics differ in terms of original
endowments such as learning capabilities, size, location, etc. Even so, intentionality
is a key factor for understanding the dynamics of human complex adaptive systems;
although this factor tends to blur or even disappear in Economics. In many models,
agents are portrayed as automata that are unable to implement the intentional pur-
suit of their interests (Rosser 2004). As a result, the main source of novelties usually
remains obscured and, as Antonelli (2011) claims, the theory of complexity does
not yet provide an analysis of the endogenous determining factors of the system’s
features.
The action plan framework presented in the foregoing sections allows for alterna-
tive uses. Our purpose in this paper has been to shed light on the endogenous link
between intentionality and the emergence of complexity in Economics. Thus, the
main use of this approach here is to locate and understand the role of intentionality in
explaining dynamic processes such as the emergence of novelty and structural change
24Examples include the analysis of the origin and evolution of techno-economic innovation systems, the
emergence of technological clusters, the evolution of institutions, etc.
25The role of beliefs, etc. has been recognised in economic theory. Recently, Acemoglu has pointed out that
the fundamental causes of economic growth are luck, geographical differences, institutional differences
and “cultural differences that determine individuals’ values, preferences and beliefs” (Acemoglu 2009:
20).
26It must be stressed that the aim of this paper is not to offer a technical solution to a particular problem.
It is an analytical proposal intended to make tractable North’s (2005) and Loasby’s (2012) challenges,
i.e.: to erect scaffoldings (analytical frameworks) that allow us to deal with human interaction and the
sources of complexity (and structural change) -scaffoldings being able to accommodate, at the same time
intentionality and different “ecologies of plans” (Wagner 2012).
that are typical of complex systems. This approach also provides another important
analytical use: it constitutes a natural place for intrinsically dynamic topics, such
as Schumpeter’s (2005 [1932]) “creator personality” (entrepreneur) and his role for
explaining economic development. The Schumpeterian entrepreneur is the analytical
subject who is especially capable of introducing new objectives, new actions or new
relationships between actions and objectives, into his action plans; in other words,
he offers creative responses to new situations (Schumpeter 1947a, b). The creator
personality is especially capable of generating novelty and, therefore, of stimulating
development. In all, novelty depends on the intentionality of agents. The fact that an
unexpected event arises from the interaction of intentional dynamics is another mat-
ter. However, this does not eliminate the fact that its origin is intentional. Of course
the creative reaction of each agent is not actually a one-off event that takes place in
isolation in time and space, but rather a historic process in which the sequence of
feedback plays a key role (Arthur 1990, 2007).
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